Abstract. In this paper, we study unconditionally secure codes that provide authentication without secrecy. 
Introduction
In this paper. we study tho application of universal hashing to the construction of unconditionally secure authenticat,iori codes without secrecy. This idea is due tlo Wegmari arid Carter [16] , who gave a construction in 1981 which is extremely useful when t h c number of authenticat,ors is small compared to the number of possible source states (plaintext messages). In 1991, Stinson [13] gave formal definitions of relevant classes of hash funct,ions, and obtained some improvements to t h e Wegman-Carter construction. Since 1991, several authors have given improved constructions for authentication-withoubsecrecy t h a t use universal hashing cithcr implicitly or explicitly. Many of the results are in fact very similar, but, d o riot appear so bccaiise they are presented using different nota.tions arid terminology. We give a brief comparison of the known constxuctions arid their efficiency, as measured by t,he amount of sccrct, key that has to be shared in order t o authenticate a givrri arriount, of information with a given level of security.
The other main contribiitioii of this paper is to generalize t h e theory of universal hashing in order-to accommodate the situation where we would like t o authenticate a sequence of messages with the same key. Unlike previous methods for doing this, we d o riot require t h a t each message in t h e sequence have a "counter" attached to it. We provide riecessary definit,ioris and theory, and then give a construction which acheives our goals. ion 2 is a brief review of' the riecessasy backgrouritl of authentication (:odes. Section 3 gives relevarit, clefinitions frorri universal hashing. We also ciomparc known authentication codes in T h e rerriairider of this paper is organized as follows. S 1 7 this section. Section 4 reviews counter-bawd multiple authentication. In Section 5 multiple authentication without counters is introduced. Section 6 provides composition constructions for the relevant hash families. Finally in Section 7 we use our co~istructions to obtain some specific families of codes for multiple authentication.
Authentication Codes
Authentication (:odes were invented in 1974 by Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloarie [5] , and the general theory of unconditional authentication was developed by Simmons (see, c.g., [ll] ) In this section we will give a brief review of standard terminology and basic results on authentication-without-secrecy.
In the usual model for authentication, there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. Thc transmitter wants to communicate some information to t,lie receiver using a public communications channel. The source state (i.e., plaintext) is concatenated with an authenticator to obtain a m.essaye which is sent through thc channel. An uuthentication rule (or key) e defines the authenticator e ( s ) to be appended to the source state s. We assume the trarismitter has a key soi1rr.e from which h r obt,ains a key. Prior to any message being sent, this key is c:ommunicat,ed t,o the receiver by means of a secure channel. Wc will usc thc following notation. Let S be a set of k source states; let A be a set of ri authenticators; define M = S x A; and 1ct & be a set of authentication rules. Each authentication rille e. : S -+ A.
Assume that the same key is used to authenticate up to w consecutive source states, where 711 is sonip fixed positive integer. Suppose an opponent observes i 5 w distinct messages which arc sent using t,lie same key. The opponent, has the ability to iritroduce new messages into the channel and/or to modify existing messages. Assume the opponent places a message m' = (s', a') into the channel by either of these methods, where rn' is distinct from the i messages already sent. That is, if e is the key being used, then the opponent is hoping that a' = e(s'). In [9] , Massey calls this a spoofing attack of order 1;.
The special cases ,i = 0 and i = 1 have received the most, attention. The case 1: = 0 is called impersonation, and the case i = 1 is called substitution.
The receiver and transmitter will choose a probability distribution for E , called an authentication strategy. It is assumed that the opponent, kriows the authent>ication strategy being used. Then, for each i 0, it is possiblc to C~I I Ipute Pdi, which is the probability that the opponent can deceive the transmitter/receiver wit,h a spoofing attack of order i . The following lower bound on Pdi is given in [9] . Theorem 1. Suppose we have a n authentacatzon code (wathout serrecy) wzth n auiheniicnfors T h e n Pd, 2 1/n f o r a11 z 2 0
Universal Hashing
In this paper, we are interested in authentication codes obtained from universal hash families. We recall soIrie definitions from [12] of various types of relevant hash families.
Definition:
-An ( N ; 711, n, rise to an authentication rule, and the authent,icatiori rules are used with equal probability. The proof of the following theorem is straightforward. We see from Theoretn 1 t,hat SU families achieve the minimum possible deception probability Pdl. The observation of Wegman and Carter [16] is that it, is possible to coristruct t-ASU hash families, having E a bit larger than l l n , that are much smaller than SU hash families. In terms of the resulting authentication codes, this means that if we allow a slightly larger deception probability Pdl , then we can reduce the key lerigth very significantly.
Many papers have used this approach, either implicitly or explicitly, for exam- a onc-time pad (t,his approach was first used by Krawczyk [7] ).
Further disc:iissiori arid examples of thesc two techniques can be found in the expository paper by Stinson [ 141.
Comparison of Authentication Codes
In this section, we briefly compare authcnticator length arid key length of for several constructions of authentication codes. To be specific, we consider the problem of authcnticating an a-bit plaintext with a b-bit authentication tag. 
This is identical to the previous c:onst,ructiori of Stinson.
Here a = bi, B = 2b and Pdl = i/2'.
Here a = ( b + s)(2' + l), P = 3b + 2s and Pdl = 1/2"'.
Here t ! z z 3h -log h a,rd Pdl = ~/ 2~-'~
In [6] (CRYPTO '96), Helleseth and Joliansson give some constructions that achieve iderilical and/or slight.ly I)ct,t.cr rcsults. Their approach also has the advantage that the parameters are a bit inore flexible than this construction. Remarks:
-Constructions 1--6 all use the Wegman-Carter approach. Constructions 7-9 use the idea of composing a ArT family with a one-t,ime pad.
-Constructions 1, 5 and 6 have Pdl = 1/2h-1, so the security level depends only on the length of the authenticxtion tag. In constructions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, the security level depends 011 the length of the authentication tag and on the length of the plaintext,. In these situations, one would start with a given plaintext length a and a given securit,y level, say 6 , and then determine the miriiIriuIri b such that P d l 5 t.
-Constructmioris 7 9 were designed with the goal of efficient, software implementation. Construct,io~is 7 and 8 achieve a short key length, but constmction 9 is not competitive with the other coristI-uctions in terms of deception probabilities and key length.
-Bierbrauer [ 11 gives some construct,ions using geometric codes that achieve extremely short key lengths. However, there are some paremetric restrictions on when they can be applied, and they would probably he more difficult to implement than the other construct,ioris mentioned above.
In Table 1 , we tabulate b a.nd P , for a = 2', 216, 232, P4 and 212* and 6 = 2-20, obtained using the different, constructions. In Table 2 
Counter-based Multiple Authentication
We will be generalizing t h e t,heor.y of uriitrersal hashing so that it can be applied to authentication of a sequence of '111 messages using one key. First, however, we review the approach used by Wegman and Carter in [16] , which is a method to authentica.tc multiple messages using any c-A S I J class of hash functions. To apply t,liis technique, the it,h message in the sequence must, be labeled with a counter having the value i, 1 Note that the authentication fiinctiori depends in an essential way upon the position of each source state within the sequence of 'ti1 source states. We also remark that this is csseritially thc method suggested by Wegnian and Carter in [16] , except that we h a w omitted a onetime pad for the first source state since it is not necessary. (This approach has also been used by othcr researchers, e.g.,
The following theorcin can be provcd in a IIiarinw similar to [16] 
(see [17] ) An 
We observe that, the definition of c -U ( N ; T I L ,~, 2) given above is the same as thc definition of d J ( N ; m , ri) that we gave in Section 3. Similarly, the definition of c-SU(N; 772, n, 2) givcn above is the same as the definition of € -S I / ( N ; 7 n 1 n) from Section 3. As well, a hash family that is both c-ASU(N; m, ri, 2 ) and (l/n)-A S U ( N ; 7 n , n l 1) (as defined above) is € -A S U ( N ; rri, 71) (as defined in Section 3).
The following lemma. describes the relation betwccn ASU and SU families.
Lemma4. Let w be a positive integer. A n ( N ; m, n)-hash family is S U ( N ; m, n, w) if and only zf it is A -i Z S U ( N ; m , n , j ) for 1 5 j 5 iu.
Proof. Suppose F is an S U ( N ;~n , n , w ) . Pick anv j , where 1 5 j 5 w. Let X I , 2 2 , . . . , x j be distinct clemcnts of A and let y l , ~2 , .
. . , y j be not necessarily 
Since this is t r w for all y,, y2, . . . , E B, we h a w and, since each hash function is used at least omc, we have
Hence
We also have the following lerrirria which shows that 6-U hash families are also d-U-w farnilics for some t' > t.
Lemrna5. S u p p o s~ F as an e -U ( N ; i n , n ) hash famaly. T h e n F zs an f(:)-
U ( N ; m , n , w ) hash fo,miZy for a n y zntegrr 'w surh that f(y) 5 1.
Proof. Sirice 7 is aa d ( N ; m , n) 
Composition Constructions
In this section, we present the cornposition constructions that we will use to achieve multiple authentication without counters. First,, we present a method which generalizes a construction from Stinson [13] F2 is a n 62(j)-ASU(N2;n.1.722,j) . . , x J t A , (all distinct,) a.nd y l l yx, . . , ,yJ E B2. Let p denote the probabilit,y that for soIric3 i , k , (1 5 i < k 5 j ) , xi, xk collide under a hash function from Fl. If fl E Fl arid f l is one-t,o-orie ori x1 , z2, . . . , x,j, the riurriber of hash functions f E .F such that !(xi) = y i for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , j is
If fl E F1 and f l is not one-to-one on X I , x2,. . . , x 3 , then the number of hash functions f E F such that f(z,) = for z = 1 , 2 , . . . , j is at most pN1 AT.?<:: (1).
Therefore, thc number of hash fiiric.t,ioris f E F siich t,hal S(z,) = yi for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , j is at most
Hcnce, we h a w
Lower bound
Let, z1,x2,. . . ,.E,!-I E A 1 (all dist,inc:t) and lct y l r y 2 , . . . ,yj-1 E B2. Let p' denote the probability that for some i , k , ( 1}1 2 NIIV2(1 -J I ' ) E 2 ( 1 ) € 2 ( 2 ) . . . E Z ( j -1) .
We ~iow combine the upper and lower bounds. We obtain the following: 
Multiple Authentication without Counters
We now use the tools of the previous section to obtain our multiple authentication codes. We could generalize many of the constructions that were mentioned in Section 3. , 2 " I 2 , j ) hash family (I 5 j 5 , w ) , whcre
following result,.
Phrasing our const,ruc.t,ion in terms of authentication codes, we obtain the In Theorem 1 2 the security level depends on the length of the authentication tag, on the lerigtli of the plaint,cxt and niiIrlber of' mcssages that are being sent. Hence, one would start with it given plaintext length a and a given security level, say E , and t,hen determine the minimum b such that <_ t. Once b is determincd, wc can proceed to compute s, and then apply Theorem 12.
In Tables 3, 4 and 5, wc tabillate the length of authentication tag and the length of the key for given a , UI: and 6 values of the authentication codes that are constructed in this wa,y from Theorem 12. 
Summary
We have generalized the theory of universal hashing to construct authentication codes that allow t h e a.utheritication of a scqiienc:e of (distinct) source states without the use of counters. It can b e seen t h a t t h e construction we have given (Theorem 12) requires considerably more key bits t h a n t h e counter-bascd method describcd in Scction 4. More efficient cunstruc:t,ions (without count,ers) wollld t,herefore be of considcrable int.erest,.
